I. INTRODUCTION
A rising wave of extremist group violence is sweeping the nation. The number of violent attacks and threats directed at Blacks, Jews, and other minorities has increased markedly during the last four years.' Since mid-1979, hundreds of acts of racial and religious violence have occurred in nearly all parts of the country. In November 1979, for example, a group of thirty Ku Klux Klansmen and American Nazis fired on demonstrators at an anti-Klan rally in Greensboro, North Carolina, killing five communist demonstrators and injuring several others. The same man later shot and killed two young black men while they were jogging in a Salt Lake City park with two white women.
tions.22 The recent rise in extremist group violence has led some legislators to call for stricter enforcement of these existing laws. 2 3 It has also spurred efforts to enact new, and sometimes constitutionally suspect, statutes. In the past three years, thirteen state legislatures have enacted laws in response to growing racial and religious terrorism. Most of these statutes prohibit acts of harassment, intimidation, and defacement of property.
2 4 Some forbid mask-wearing 25 or the carrying of weapons in certain circumstances. 26 Two prohibit paramilitary training, 2 7 and one new law requires that separate criminal statistics be kept by state police for "incidents apparently directed against racial, religious, or ethnic groups. '' 28 California has adopted a proposal that allows courts to enjoin advocacy of the commission of any act of violence at group meetings under certain circumstances. 29 Texas has considered but not Supp. 1983 ) (limited liability of parents for children's destruction or defacement of religious property); OR. REV. STAT. § § 30.190, .200 (1981) (a) It shall be unlawful for any group, association, organization, society, or other assemblage of two or more persons to meet and to advocate, and to take substantial action in furtherance of, the commission of an unlawful act of violence or force directed to and likely to produce the imminent and unlawful infliction of serious bodily injury or death of another person within this state.
(b) Whenever it reasonably appears that any group, association, society, or other assemblage of two or more persons has met and taken substantial action in furtherance of adopted a proposal to prohibit members of secret societies from bringing firearms to their meetings. 30 Many state laws thus attempt to restrict both the violent and nonviolent activities of extremist groups, rather than focusing directly on their violent activities.
3 ' Anti-mask statutes and laws restricting meeting activities raise serious first amendment questions. The constitutional rights of Klan members and Nazis to freedom of expression and association may well limit the effectiveness of legislative efforts to curtail their activities.
Speech Rights and Violent Extremist Groups
The first amendment guarantees of free speech and free association 32 apply to all citizens regardless of the views they espouse. In the landmark first amendment case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 33 the United
States Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a Klan leader for violation of an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute. Brandenburg had been convicted for suggesting in a speech at a Klan rally that it might be necessary to take some "revengeance" if the federal government continued "to suppress the white, Caucasian race . . . . 34 The Court held that:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
35
Brandenburg created a broad protection for the speech activities of violent extremist groups. Neither the states nor the federal government can punish such groups for merely advocating violence as a means of achieving their ends. Only when speech amounts to the planning or the commission of an act of violence made unlawful by subdivision (a) and will engage in those acts in the future, any aggrieved individual may bring a civil action in the superior court to enjoin the advocacy of the commission of any act of violence made unlawful by subdivision (a) at any future meeting or meetings. encouragement of imminent criminal conduct, where such conduct is likely to occur, can the government proscribe the speech itself. 36 Brandenburg's distinction between mere advocacy and the planning of imminent violence makes it difficult to draft a statute that will meet its standard, and even more difficult to enforce such a statute in a manner that will prevent violence. The first amendment may also protect the wearing of masks, military-style uniforms, or swastikas as symbolic expression. Underlying state anti-mask statutes is the assumption that people are more likely to engage in violent or unlawful activities if their identities are unknown, as well as the knowledge that identification of those who engage in such activities assists police efforts to make arrests.
3 7 Anti-mask statutes, however, face constitutional problems.
State courts have struck down statutes prohibiting the public wearing of masks that conceal the identity of the wearer. In Ghafari v. Munici- It is a misdemeanor for any person, either alone or in company with others, to appear on any street or highway, or in other public places or any place open to view by the general public, with his face partially or completely concealed by means of a mask or other regalia or paraphernalia, with intent thereby to conceal his identity. This section does not prohibit the wearing of such means of concealment in good faith for the purpose of amusement, entertainment or in compliance with any public health order.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 650a (West 1976).
40 87 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 816. The statute was held overbroad because its complete prohibition infringed first amendment activities (here, a demonstration by masked Iranian students protesting the rule of the Shah of Iran). As in the Aryan case, in fta note 49 and accompanying text, the students feared reprisals against themselves and their families if their identities were known. Id. at 259, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 814. The Ghafari court also expressed the view that the statute's prohibition went beyond any legitimate law enforcement concern because another state statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 185 (West 1976) , existed that prohibited the wearing of a mask for the purpose of avoiding identification in the commission of an offense. Id. at 261-62, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
41 The statute was held unconstitutionally vague because the exception for amusement or entertainment purposes forced speakers, the police, and courts to make impossible distinctions along a continuum of forms of expression, thereby causing a chilling effect on first amendment rights. Ghafari and Robinson make it clear that blanket prohibitions on maskwearing are not acceptable under the first amendment. 46 The appellants in both cases also argued that their mask-wearing was a form of symbolic speech fully protected by the first amendment, 47 but neither the Giafari nor the Robinson court reached that issue.
48
The only court to consider whether the first amendment protects the wearing of masks where it is a form of symbolic speech upheld the right to wear masks. In Ayan v. Mackq 49 Iranian students successfully challenged a Texas Technical University decision forbidding them to wear masks during their demonstration against the Shah of Iran. The district court noted that the wearing of masks by Iranian demonstrators had become "a symbol of opposition to a regime which is of such a character that its detractors believe they must disguise their identity to protect themselves."°5 0 The court relied heavily on the University's failure to support its assertions that the anonymity of the demonstrators would foster disruptive or violent conduct. No person or persons shall in this state, while wearing any mask, hood, or device whereby any portion of the face is so hidden, concealed, or covered as to conceal the identity of the wearer, enter upon, or be, or appear upon or within the public property of any municipality or county of the state. 45 393 So. 2d at 1077. The statute was fatally overbroad because it was "susceptible of application to entirely innocent activities." Id. A few months later, the Florida legislature enacted a provision limiting the application of the statute to situations in which the mask is worn with the intent to intimidate or harass another, or while engaged in criminal conduct, or in other specified circumstances. FLA. STAT (1969) , both involving "symbolic speech" claims, a governmental regulation imposing incidental restrictions on free expression is valid if: (1) "it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest," Aovan, 462 F. Supp. at 93, (2) "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression," id., (3) "there is a sufficient nexus between the restriction and the interest," id., and (4) the incidental The wearing of masks undoubtedly preserves the anonymity of Klan members.
52 Mask-wearing, however, may also have a communicative aspect in certain circumstances that raises the wearing of the traditional white hood-masks 53 to the level of protected "symbolic speech." 54 Although the first amendment does not grant an absolute right to anonymity, 55 freedom of speech may be impaired "when there is such a nexus between anonymity and speech that a bar on the first is restriction of expression "is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest," id. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09. The Aryan court held that the third requirement was not met, 462 F. Supp. at 93, as there was "no concrete proof that these students in this demonstration will erupt into the violence that the no mask regulation is supposed to prevent." Id. at 94. Because the connection between the mask prohibition and the University's interest in preventing violence was "merely speculative," the regulation unconstitutionally infringed free expression. Id.
52 The main purpose of wearing the masks may vary in different contexts. In a Klan-only gathering, the primary purpose may be symbolic or ceremonial, as other members presumably know the identity of the wearer. In a march or public gathering, one purpose may be to conceal the identity of the wearer, so as to avoid reprisal for espousing racist views or to facilitate criminal conduct, or both. Another purpose may be to convey a symbolic message to onlookers. See infta note 54 and accompanying text.
53 The traditional Klan regalia of white robe and pointed hood-mask dates back to the Reconstruction Era, when the Klan was founded, although originally the costumes were much more elaborate. See generally A History of Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 6-19; D. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM 11-16 (1965) . Klan members have continued to wear the masks during public marches and at Klan ceremonies.
54 The Supreme Court has yet to articulate a complete test for determining whether particular conduct constitutes "symbolic speech" within the protection of the first amendment. It is clear that conduct may not be labeled "speech" simply because "the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. The Court has looked to "the nature of... [the] activity, combined with the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken," to determine whether protected expression was involved. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) . In Spence, the Court held that the taping of a peace symbol to an American flag in protest of the Cambodian invasion and Kent State killings was a form of protected "symbolic speech," and that the state had not demonstrated a compelling interest in prohibiting such a display. Id. at 415. The Court noted that the defendant had "[aln intent to convey a particularized message," and that "the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." Id. at 410-11. The particular messages conveyed by Klan members wearing robes and hood-masks are undoubtedly that they consider themselves to be an "invisible empire" (i.e., that they are representatives of an invisible government), and that they continue to espouse the views and traditional practices of their racist predecessors dating back over a century. The first amendment also protects the right of violent extremist groups to publicly demonstrate, and to wear military uniforms and the swastika, even in communities strongly opposed to the groups' presence. In a series of state and federal decisions 6 o arising out of the planned march of American Nazis through Skokie, Illinois, the courts held that residents could not prevent the Nazi march nor preclude the wearing of the party uniform, the display of the swastika, or the distribution of anti-Semitic literature. 61 The Skokie litigation establishes that permissible limitations on the speech and demonstrations of violent extremist 56 Id. The Supreme Court has long recognized the close connection between anonymity in some contexts and the preservation of first amendment freedoms. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) , the Court invalidated a state statute requiring the NAACP to turn over its membership lists, where it was clear that members would be subjected to reprisals because of their membership in the organization. In Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), the Court invalidated a city ordinance requiring those printing or distributing handbills to print their names and addresses on the handbills. In both cases, the Court expressed concern that those espousing dissident beliefs would be deterred from engaging in speech and association activities if their identities were known. (1978) . The denial of the stay came thirteen days before the scheduled march. Having won the fight, the Nazis cancelled the Skokie march three days before it was to take place, but used the precedents created to gain long-denied access to Chicago city parks. G. GUNTHER (1969) . 76 The balancing test applied in NAACP was not used in Bgant because "freedom of association" was simply not yet a defined constitutional right. In fact, the first amendment was not even discussed in Bryant. The defendant's arguments were based on the privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 278 U.S. at 65, 71-73. ment of the New York statute in Byant did not pose the danger that Klan members would face harassment or economic hardship when their affiliation was revealed. 77 Today, while the Klan appears to be gaining in acceptance among some segments of society, 78 other segments appear adamantly opposed to it.7
9 Thus, Klan members may well face economic and social reprisals upon revelation of their membership.
8 0 In these circumstances, the associational interests of Klan members may outweigh any legitimate interest of the state in obtaining membership lists.
Klan members do not have, however, an absolute right to anonymity whenever they face private reprisals. While the first amendment guarantees the freedom to associate for the purpose of espousing and advocating racism, it does not protect association for the purpose of pursuing racist ends through violence and intimidation.
8 ' The outcome of applying the NAACP balancing test to the question of whether a state can obtain Klan membership lists depends on the particular circumstances involved, such as the severity of the group's unlawful conduct and the likelihood that the members' freedom to associate would be threatened.
B. PROBLEMS WITH STATE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS
State legislation that meets the constitutional standards described above can deter extremist group violence only if police, prosecutors, and courts enforce the statutes. In the early 1960's, state court systems com- Other problems with state criminal prosecutions persist. Assault and intimidation convictions in racial violence cases are often met with short or suspended sentences, and even some severe injury and death cases result in relatively lenient sentences.
t 00 Moreover, local prosecutors often dismiss incidents of intimidation as "pranks," without serious investigation. 101 Local prosecutors sometimes ignore housing interference incidents, such as shootings into blacks' homes that do not cause physical injuries.102
Many factors contribute to the failure of local prosecutors to bring suit and of local juries to convict. The continued prevalence of racism and prejudice helps to explain the inadequate response of local legal systems to racial violence and intimidation. In a random-sample survey of the nine-county Chattanooga area in early 1982,103 over thirty-two [Vol. 75 percent of all white respondents reported that they liked the Ku Klux Klan or some aspects of it. 104 Even more disturbing were the findings of the survey that over forty-eight percent of the respondents agreed that the right of blacks to demonstrate should be restricted, and that almost fifty-five percent thought that "[t]here needs to be an organization to stand up for the rights of white people."' 0 5
The intensity of such feelings tends to increase during periods of racial tension, making convictions of guilty defendants even more difficult to obtain.1 0 6
While such attitudes are more prevalent in some areas than others, racism is still a nationwide problem. Studies indicate that twenty-five to thirty-five percent of all Americans still harbor anti-Semitic stereotypes.107 In addition, Gallup polls have shown a noticeable increase over the past ten years in the number of persons who approve of Klan activities.' 08 Such attitudes have been shared by enough voters in some areas to result in major party nominations of avowed Klan and Nazi Congressional candidates.' 0 9
Tenn. 1980). The success of the plaintiffs in this federal lawsuit against the defendants who were acquitted or given light sentences in the state criminal prosecution (Supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text) adds weight to the asserted connection between the attitudes reflected in the survey and the failure of state court systems to respond adequately to raciallymotivated violence. 104 Seltzer, supra note 98, at 7. 105 Id. at 8, 13. 106 See general'y A History of Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 41. The failed state prosecutions in Greensboro and Chattanooga followed shooting incidents that occurred in the context of tense racial situations. In Greensboro, the shooting occurred during the last of a series of clashes between anti-Klan demonstrators and Klansmen in North Carolina. Eighoeight Seconds in Greerboro, Frontline (Public Broadcast System) (Jan. 24, 1983). In Chattanooga, the shooting occurred soon after televised debates between local NAACP officers and Klan leaders, and in the midst of a recruiting drive by local Klan factions. Telephone interview with George A. Key, President of the Chattanooga Chapter of the NAACP (April 23, 1984) . In such circumstances, the relative swiftness with which local prosecutions come to trial may actually be a detriment to success, because the often all-white jury is drawn from a local populace that well remembers the tense period of confrontation. Aware that punishment is less likely and less severe when violent attacks on minorities occur in the context of riots or other social unrest, Klan members instigate or exacerbate such situations, attempting to create a climate in which they can engage freely in beatings, killings, and other violence. A History of Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 51. As a result, local legal systems are least likely to produce a certain and adequate response to such violence when it is needed most. The continuing inability of state and local legal systems to deter and punish racially motivated violent criminals should be met consistently with efforts to improve state legislation and judicial enforcement.
1 10 Such improvements, however, can be realized only over a long-term period. Increased reliance on federal civil rights remedies would provide an immediate and effective supplement to state enforcement systems. These federal civil rights remedies are explored in the next section.
III. AN 110 As the bias of state court juries seems to present a major problem, improvement efforts should include ending the prevalence of all-white juries and improving public education on racial issues. Present efforts to make state court juries representative of local populations, however 111 See supra note 110. 112 As stated in the introduction, the most effective approach to deterring and punishing racial violence is a two-tiered system of federal prosecution and civil remedies, combined with improvements in state legislation and enforcement systems.
113 If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so securedThey shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life. Section 241 is the current version of § 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, 2 ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870), enacted immediately after ratification of the fifteenth amendment to enforce that amendment. Section 241 has been the subject of longstanding disagreement among courts and commentators on two related questions of constitutional import: (I) to what extent does the section proscribe wholly private conduct, as opposed to conduct involving "state action," and (2) what are the rights "secured by" the Constitution and laws of the United States?
The first question depends largely on whether Congress can proscribe wholly private action under the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment in order to enforce that amend- the elements of the crime become readily apparent. Two or more persons must: (1) conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, (2) in order to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate a citizen, (3) with a specific intent to interfere with a federal right defined by decision or other rule of law. 1 2 7 Although the federal rights protected by section 241 are all those rights secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, 128 the rights so secured must be within the power of Congress to protect from interference by the defendant. For example, if the defendant acted in a wholly private capacity, the federal right relied upon must be one that Congress can constitutionally protect from interference by private individuals. 127 In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982), a criminal statute analogous to § 241, but including an "under color of law" limitation, was not unconstitutionally vague. The Court in Screws construed the word "willfully" in § 242 narrowly, and required "an intent to deprive a person of a right which has been made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them." 325 U.S. at 104. Acting "willfully" in this sense means acting "in open defiance or in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has been made specific and definite." Id. at 105.
In Guest, the Court applied the same "strict scienter" requirement to violations of § 241, noting that "the gravamen of the offense is conspiracy, [therefore] the requirement that the offender must act with a specific intent to interfere with the federal rights in question is satisfied." 383 U.S. at 753-54. seriously.131
The four defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 241 by conspiring to "injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate" the young couple "in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right" to interstate travel.
3 2 Three of the defendants pled guilty to the charge; the other was convicted. 33 The second count of the indictment charged the defendants with violating 18 U.S.C. § § 2(a) 134 and 245(b)(2)(E)1 35 by aiding and abetting each other to "willfully injure, intimidate and interfere with" the complainant, "because of his race and color," and because he was traveling in interstate commerce. 36 The same three defendants pled guilty to this second charge, and the other was convicted. In United States v. Bishop,1 38 five Klansmen planned to kill one black man for moving into a "white" neighborhood, and to kill another for frequenting a "white" bar.' 3 9 The first attack was called off,' 40 but the second resulted in two attempts to shoot the victim, first as he left the bar, and again when he arrived home.' 4 '
In connection with the aborted attack, two of the defendants were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 241 by conspiring to "injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate" a citizen "in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right" to "hold property and to occupy a dwelling without injury, intimidation, or interference" because of race or color. 142 Three of the defendants were also convicted of violating section 241 by conspiring to injure the victim of the attempted shooting in "the free exercise and enjoyment" of his right to "full and equal use of a place of public accommodation without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin ....
In United States v. Redwine, 144 three defendants were convicted of violating section 241 by conspiring to "injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate" a black family in the free exercise of its right to occupy a dwelling without interference because of race. 145 The defendants had harassed the family for moving into an all-white neighborhood by throwing rocks and bottles through the windows, shouting racial epithets, and finally firebombing the home. . 145 Id. at 318. The defendants were also convicted under 42 U.S.C. § 3631 for interference with housing rights. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text for discussion of another prosecution under § 3631. Two of the defendants in Redwine were sentenced to prison for a total of six years each. The third defendant, a minor, was committed to the Attorney General for supervision under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § § 5005-5026 (1982 Increased enforcement of other federal criminal civil rights statutes may also help curb the rising incidence of racial violence and intimidation. These statutes were used effectively in United States v. Johns1 54 to punish ten Klansmen and associates for three racially motivated violent attacks. The defendants fired shotguns into the home of two racially 149 These rights stem from part of § 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (currently 42 U.S.C. § § 1981, 1982 (1976) Another possible theory the Supreme Court could adopt is that the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment comprises the fundamental rights of citizens. Under such an expanded view of the clause, the question of Congressional power to enforce fourteenth amendment rights against private interference would again possibly limit the reach of § 241. See supra note 124. Assuming the Court would also uphold such congressional power under the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment, § 241 could presumably again reach all threats to life, liberty, and property.
If either of these constitutional views were adopted, the rather broad reach of § 241 could be limited to areas in which the federal government has a legitimate interest, and in which state protection is demonstrably deficient. Thus, amendment of the statute to require a racial or religious motivation on the part of the perpetrator of the crime could provide a limit to its protection, while insuring that acts of racial violence and intimidation do not go unpunished simply because no adequate basis of federal jurisdiction exists under present interpretations of the statute and the Constitution.
[Vol. 75 mixed couples, and the homes of two local NAACP leaders. If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor. 158 Johns, 615 F.2d at 674. 159 Id. 160 Id. at 675. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, upholding all the convictions on appeal, stated that "[tihe legislative history accompanying 42 U.S.C. § 3631 and 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) indicates a clear congressional intent to impose criminal sanctions on persons who engage in the conduct appellants were found to have participated in and with the intent appellants were found to have had." Id.
161 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1982) provides in part: (b) Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with-(2) any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and because he is or has been-(A) enrolling in or attending any public school or public college; (B) participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility or activity provided or administered by any State or subdivision thereof; (C) applying for or enjoying employment, or any perquisite thereof, by any private employer or any agency of any State or subdivision thereof, or joining or age the NAACP's efforts to secure better employment opportunities for local blacks, an activity protected from private interference by section 245.163 All ten defendants received sentences of two to four years. 64 using the services or advantages of any labor organization, hiring hall, or employment agency; (D) serving, or attending upon any court of any State in connection with possible service, as a grand or petit juror; (E) traveling in or using any facility of interstate commerce, or using any vehicle, terminal, or facility of any common carrier by motor, rail, water, or air; (F) enjoying the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, or of any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility which serves the public and which is principally engaged in selling food or beverages for consumption on the premises, or of any gasoline station, or of any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or any other place of exhibition or entertainment which serves the public, or of any other establishment which serves the public and (i) which is located within the premises of any of the aforesaid establishments or within the premises of which is physically located any of the aforesaid establishments, and (ii) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such establishments; or (4) any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from-(A) participating, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin, in any of the benefits or activities described in subparagraphs (1)(A) through (1)(E) or subparagraphs (2)(A) through (2)(F); or (B) affording another person or class of persons opportunity or protection to so participate; or (5) any citizen because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such citizen or any other citizen from lawfully aiding or encouraging other persons to participate, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin, in any of the benefits or activities described in subparagraphs (1)(A) through (1)(E) or subparagraphs (2) (A) through (2) (F), or participating lawfully in speech or peaceful assembly opposing any denial of the opportunity to so participateshall'be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life. 162 See supra note 157 for text of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). 163 Johns, 615 F.2d at 676; 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(C); see also supra note 160. Because § 245 specifically enumerates the federal rights it protects and carries a sliding scale of penalties, it is an excellent prosecutorial tool for punishing private racial violence and intimidation in many circumstances. The narrow language of § 245 is also often a detriment to federal prosecution. The defendant in Franklin was the same man who had earlier shot Vernon Jordan, then President of the National Urban League, outside a Fort Wayne, Indiana hotel in 1980. Franklin was also prosecuted for that crime in 1982, under § 245, but was acquitted. Although the jury was apparently convinced that Franklin shot Jordan, it was not convinced that he did so because Jordan was enjoying the services of the hotel. Telephone interview, supra note 4. The nine former Klansmen and Nazis prosecuted under § 245 for killing five communist demonstrators in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1979 were also acquitted. See supra note 96. Racial or religious motivation must be shown for an offense to be cognizable under § 245. The Greens-Kigore, Bishop, Redwine, and Johns illustrate the versatility and breadth of the federal criminal civil rights statutes. These laws are especially well-adapted for the kind of organized conspiracies that characterize the terroristic activities of violent extremist groups. 16 5 In view of the increasing rise in violence directed at racial and religious minorities, . This "wait and see" policy apparently has reasserted itself in full force. The Department of Justice policy prior to 1977 concerning dual prosecutions of an individual for the same act was to defer to the state investigation and prosecution and to proceed only when the conduct involved was particularly egregious and elicited intense public outrage. Id. at 28, 32 (referring to the circumstances of United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966)). A new policy was instituted under Attorney General Griffin Bell in 1977 that mandated consideration of each criminal civil rights violation on its own merits, "regardless of whatever related enforcement action has been taken by the states." Memorandum to All United States Attorneys, Dual Prosecution Polily in Cases Involving Violations of Civil Rights, from Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General (July 12, 1977), reprinted in Increasing Violence ,supra note 1, at 121. By 1980, it was apparent that the Department was not living up to its stated objective and was still deferring to local proceedings, taking action only when local prosecutors failed to produce adequate results. Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 118 (statement of Althea T.L. Simmons). By 1983, consideration of the adequacy of a state prosecution for racial violence was no longer considered irrelevant to the question of proceeding with a federal prosecution. Such consideration had become an integral part of the decision whether to prosecute federally. Telephone interview, supra note 4; see infra note 173.
[Vol. 75 sentences, the Department will assess its chances of success, weighing the evidence and the claim of federal jurisdiction, 172 and then decide whether to convene a grand jury.1 73 Indictments and eventually convictions may be secured, perhaps as long as three or four years after the crime has been committed.' 74 This system has failed adequately to deter and punish racially motivated violence. The Department of Justice should not defer to state prosecutions when it has an adequate basis for proceeding immediately. 175 Convening a federal grand jury soon after outbreaks of racial violence in an area can have a strong deterrent effect on future vio-172 That is, the Department determines whether the conduct involved is cognizable under one or more of the federal criminal civil rights statutes. See, e.g., supra note 124.
173 The Department of Justice presently employs three criteria in determining whether to prosecute in a criminal civil rights case:
(1) The meeting of the relatively narrow jurisdictional requirements of one or more federal criminal civil rights statutes; (2) The likelihood of conviction ofthe accused (ie., is the accused the actual perpetrator of the crime); In most instances, obtaining indictments and convictions under federal civil rights statutes does not take so long, as federal authorities are usually quick to prosecute when it is apparent that no state prosecution is forthcoming. When federal officials defer to a state prosecution and await its outcome, however, the dangerous perception of a weak and ineffectual governmental response arises and exacerbates an already tense situation. See general Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 93-94, 95-98; Charns, supra note 2, at 9, col. 1. When a state prosecution fails to convict or adequately sentence defendants in racial violence and intimidation cases, violent extremist groups claim victory and "vindication" of their actions and ideas. Several of the defendants acquitted in the Greensboro state prosecution have since become heroes of Klan-Nazi society, and now frequently appear as speakers at rallies. A History of Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 50. t 76 If the state also prosecutes the offenders, the deterrent effect is even greater, but state prosecution does not relieve federal officials of their responsibility to enforce federal law. American history, from the Reconstruction Era to the Civil Rights Movement, indicates that the federal government has of necessity become the primary guarantor of individual civil rights, 17 7 especially the right to be free of injury or intimidation because of one's race or religion. Responsibility rests, therefore, on the federal government to prosecute actively all acts of racial and religious violence and intimidation that are subject to federal jurisdiction.
B. RECENT CIVIL CASES UNDER FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES
The power of the criminal civil rights statutes to deter racial violence and harassment is of course limited; the statutes can only punish the perpetrators of harm after-the-fact, and can only be enforced by the federal government, not by private parties. Suits brought by private plaintiffs under the civil sections of the federal civil rights acts can pre- 176 Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 29. 177 Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes, made the federal courts "thepima,7 and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States." Steffel v. Thompson (1) the defendants "'must conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another,' (2) 'for the purpose of depriving. . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws,'" (3) the defendants must act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, whereby (4) another is (a) injured in person or property, or (b) "'deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.' ", 184 As interpreted by the Court in 6rzz, "intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. 495-96 (1974) , the Court in Giint held § 1985(c) applied to private conspiracies. But to limit the reach of the broad language of the statute, the Court interpreted the "purpose of depriving. . .any person. . . of the equal protection of the laws" language in the statute to mean that "there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." 403 U.S. at 102. Because the Grftn plaintiffs suffered deprivations of thirteenth amendment rights and the right of interstate travel, the Court did not decide whether the statute reached wholly private conspiracies against fourteenth amendment rights. Thus, the Court in Gjiz also did not consider whether Congress has power to reach private action under section five of the fourteenth amendment. 403 
190
The statute is well-suited to this end because of its broad language, and because the goals and methods of the Klan and other violent extremist groups are essentially the same as they were during the Reconstruction Era. 192 Among the other causes of action was one based on 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976) , which provides in part:
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented .... The statute is derived from § 6 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. 15 (1871). The statute creates an inherent second cause of action against every conspirator, as each necessarily knows of the acts "to be committed," and could prevent their occurrence by, for example, contacting the police.
193 Adams, complaint at 5. The object of the conspiracy was to threaten and physically attack the plaintiffs so as to force them to leave the area. To establish a violation of section 1985(c), the plaintiffs had to prove that the defendants conspired to deprive them of the equal protec- The plaintiff class presented two grounds for an injunction against the Klan's military activities: (1) "to remedy fully the profound deprivation by defendants of plaintiffs' constitutional rights, '2 17 and (2) to enforce article 5780, section 6, of Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated, 21 8 which prohibits the formation of private armies. 2 19 The court issued a permanent injunction against the Klan's military activities on the first ground, relying on the findings of the preliminary hearing that had established the defendants' violation of plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C. § § 1981, 1985(c) , and 1986. 220 The court held further that issuance of the injunction did not violate the defendants' rights of free speech and association, 22 ' nor their second amendment right to bear arms. 222 The court's finding that the injunction could be granted solely on the basis of the defendants' deprivation of the plaintiffs' civil rights, without resort to the state statute prohibiting private armies, is especially important. Although twenty-four other states have anti-paramilitary laws, 223 Klan paramilitary training is already occurring in states that do not have such laws. 224 The court stated that equitable principles dictated that an injunction issue against the "Texas Emergency Reserve" because "it is the [Texas Emergency Reserve] which enables the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and those who conspire with them, to perpetuate their threats of intimidation and violence toward the plaintiff class and provide[s] the wherewithal to carry out those threats. ' 225 As the court noted, the Klan paramilitary phenomenon is a nationwide problem. 226 When private military organizations seek to interfere by force with the civil rights of minority citizens, such inherently dangerous activities must be enjoined.
7
The civil remedy provided by section 1985(c) has been invoked recently to protect the first amendment right of minorities to engage in demonstrations or protest marches. Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. The Invisible Empire, Knghts of the Ku Klux Klan 2 2 8 is a class action lawsuit currently being brought on behalf of all Alabama blacks that seeks to recover $43 million in damages from the nation's largest Klan organization and to enjoin it from interfering with the federally protected rights of the class.
22 9 The case is based on terrorist activities carried out against blacks in Decatur, Alabama that culminated in a violent attack on peaceful protesters in May 1979. 230 The plaintiffs asefficiency of a well regulated militia,' organized by the State." Id. The State of Texas, then, in the absence of federal preemption, was the sole judge of the proper means to maintain its militia and it had by statute prohibited private armies. See supra notes 218- Adams and Vietnamese Fishermen-' are excellent illustrations of the broad preventive and compensatory powers of the Reconstruction Era civil rights acts. Wider recognition and employment of these civil remedies is needed to help curb outbreaks of racial violence. A movement in this direction has begun, but it must be strengthened if these civil statutes are to provide a credible deterrent to racial violence and intimidation.
